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Abstract 
Since the decision of the House of Lords in Malik v Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (in liq), Australian courts have been grappling with 
claims from employees that an employer has breached a duty not to destroy 
‘mutual trust and confidence’ in the employment relationship. Rarely have any 
of these claims sounded in a remedy of damages for the aggrieved employee, so 
despite the considerable number of cases raising the issue, it has never been 
resolved by the Australian High Court that this duty exists in Australian law. 
The Commonwealth Bank’s appeal in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v 
Barker provides such an opportunity. The case may also be expected to 
illuminate circumstances when a new term can be implied by law, as a matter of 
necessity, and how principles of contract construction apply in the context of 
Australian employment contracts. 
I Introduction 
The appeal in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker1 provides the High Court 
of Australia with an opportunity to settle one of the most contentious questions in 
Australian employment law: does Australian employment contract law recognise 
(as English law does) an employer’s obligation ‘not, without reasonable and proper 
cause, [to] conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and 
employee’?2 And if it does, what is the basis of that obligation? Is it a term implied                                                         
∗  Dean and Professor of Labour Law, Sydney Law School, The University of Sydney. 
1  Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2013) 214 FCR 450 (‘Barker Appeal’). For the transcript 
of the Special Leave application to the High Court of Australia, see Transcript of Proceedings, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2013] HCATrans 325 (13 December 2013). 
2  This is the form of words used to describe the obligation in the House of Lords decision in Malik v 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liq) [1998] AC 20, 49 (‘Malik’). For 
commentary on the English law, see Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 154–70; Douglas Brodie, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and 
Confidence’ (1996) 25 Industrial Law Journal 121; Douglas Brodie, ‘Beyond Exchange: the New 
Contract of Employment’ (1998) 27 Industrial Law Journal 79; Douglas Brodie, ‘A Fair Deal at 
Work’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 83; Douglas Brodie, ‘Mutual Trust and the 
Values of the Employment Contract’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 84; Douglas Brodie, The 
Employment Contract: Legal Principles, Drafting and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 
2005) 78–9; Douglas Brodie, ‘Mutual Trust and Confidence: Catalysts, Constraints and 
Commonality’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 329; Justice Lindsay, ‘The Implied Term of Trust 
and Confidence’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 1; Mark Freedland, ‘Constructing Fairness in 
Employment Contracts’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 136; David Cabrelli, ‘The Implied Duty 
of Mutual Trust and Confidence: An Emerging Overarching Principle’ (2005) 34 Industrial Law 
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by law into all employment contracts, because the ‘nature of the contract itself 
implicitly requires’ it, as a matter of ‘necessity’?3 Is it rather a term to be implied 
in fact in specific contracts, and only when the elements of the BP Refinery 
(Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings4 test have been satisfied, one of those 
elements being that the term must be ‘necessary to give business efficacy to the 
contract’?5 Or is the term better dealt with as a general principle of construction of 
employment contracts?6  
The Commonwealth Bank is appealing from a decision of the Full Court of 
the Federal Court of Australia in which the Court was sharply divided on these 
questions. The majority, Jacobson and Lander JJ, accepted that ‘the implied term 
has obtained a sufficient degree of recognition both in England and Australia, that 
it ought to be accepted by an intermediate court of appeal’, and went on to find in 
favour of the respondent employee, Mr Stephen John Barker.7 Justice Jessup, 
however, found in favour of the Bank on the basis that there is not, nor should 
there be, any recognition of an implied term of trust and confidence in Australian 
employment contract law.8 In short, Jessup J held that the English law was based 
on shaky authority;9 the supposed duty of trust and confidence cannot be justified 
as a ‘principled development of the implied duty of co-operation’;10 it fails the test 
of ‘necessity’;11 and its introduction into Australian law would ‘compromise the 
democratically-drawn architecture’12 of a range of more recent statutory 
interventions into Australian employment law. 
In the middle of this important debate is Mr Barker, who lost his job with 
the Commonwealth Bank after some 27 years’ service in various positions. Despite                                                                                                                                 
Journal 284. For Australian scholarship on this development, see Adrian Brooks, ‘The Good and 
Considerate Employer: Developments in the Implied Duty of Mutual Trust and Confidence’ (2001) 
20 University of Tasmania Law Review 26; Joellen Riley, ‘Mutual Trust and Good Faith: Can 
Private Contract Law Guarantee Fair Dealing in the Workplace?’ (2003) 16 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 28; Kelly Godfrey, ‘Contracts of Employment: the Renaissance of the Implied Term 
of Trust and Confidence’ (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 764; Joellen Riley, Employee 
Protection at Common Law (Federation Press, 2005) 73–6; Phillipa Weeks, ‘Employment Law — a 
Test of Coherence Between Statute and Common Law’ in Suzanne Corcoran and Stephen 
Bottomley (eds), Interpreting Statutes (Federation Press, 2005) 166–96; Andrew Stewart, ‘Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing at Work’ in Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market 
Regulation (Federation Press, 2006) 579, 583–4; Joellen Riley, ‘The Boundaries of Mutual Trust 
and Good Faith’ (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law 73; Andrew Stewart, ‘Good Faith: 
A Necessary Element in Australian Employment Law?’ (2011) 32 Comparative Labor Law & Policy 
Journal 521, 543–4; Joellen Riley, ‘Siblings but not Twins: Making Sense of ‘Mutual Trust’ and 
‘Good Faith’ in Employment Contracts’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 521, 525–30. 
3  See Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 254 (Lord Wilberforce). See also University of 
Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346, 376 [139]. 
4  (1977) 180 CLR 266, 282–3. 
5  Ibid. 
6  For the construction argument, see John Carter and Elisabeth Peden, ‘Good Faith in Australian 
Contract Law’ (2003) 19 Journal of Contract Law 1. 
7  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 456 [13]. 
8  Ibid 531 [340]. 
9  Ibid 490 [226], 531 [340(a)]. 
10  Ibid 531 [340(d)]. 
11  Ibid 511–15 [284]–[295]. 
12  Ibid 531 [340(g)]. 
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a long and convoluted story about his falling out with others at the Bank,13 the 
facts ultimately settled as legally relevant at first instance were straightforward, 
and concerned whether his contract with the Bank included an entitlement to be 
considered for redeployment opportunities before dismissal for reasons of 
redundancy. So, in determining this dispute, the High Court of Australia will also 
be deciding whether Mr Barker, who was dismissed in April 2009, should be 
entitled to keep the $317 500 awarded to him in September 2012 for breach of his 
employment contract with the Bank. 
II Facts and Findings at First Instance 
Mr Barker was born in 1964 and joined the Commonwealth Bank directly upon 
completing his schooling in 1981. For more than 20 years he worked his way up 
through the ranks, and in 2004 he was promoted to an executive manager position. 
His employment with the Bank came to an end in April 2009, and in 2010 he 
brought his suit against the Bank for breach of his employment contract. His initial 
catalogue of complaints included a claim that the Bank’s decision to make his 
position redundant was influenced by some unpleasant office politics, and this 
constituted breach of the Bank’s duty not to destroy mutual trust and confidence in 
the employment relationship,14 but this claim was rejected at first instance,15 and 
so did not feature in the Bank’s appeal from Besanko J’s decision. (A claim based 
on breach of the prohibition against misleading and deceptive conduct under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)16 also failed and formed no part of the appeal.)  
Mr Barker won his case at first instance on the basis that the Bank had 
breached his employment contract by failing to afford him the benefit of its 
redeployment policy after his management position had been made redundant. The 
redeployment policy was included in the Bank’s Human Resources (‘HR’) 
Reference Manual. The Manual included a statement asserting: ‘The Manual is not 
in any way incorporated as part of any industrial award or agreement entered into 
by the Bank, nor does it form any part of an employee’s contract of 
employment.’17 The redeployment policy included a set of procedures that enabled 
employees to receive information about and opportunities to apply for other 
positions within the Bank, if their own positions were made redundant. Mr Barker 
was not afforded these opportunities because one of the managers who informed 
Mr Barker that his position was redundant had required him to clear his desk, 
surrender his mobile phone and leave the office at the end of that day.18 This meant 
that he was not able to receive the notifications sent to his office email account and 
his work phone about other vacancies when they arose. Whoever was responsible 
for forwarding him information on other positions ignored bounce-backs from 
email messages, and made no attempt to forward the information to his home 
address. He missed out on the necessary information about redeployment                                                         
13  See Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2012) 229 IR 249 (Besanko J) (‘Barker’). 
14  Ibid 303–4 [334]–[339]. 
15  Ibid 304 [341]–[342]. 
16  This Act has subsequently been renamed as the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
17  Barker (2012) 229 IR 249, 293 [283]. 
18  Ibid 282 [208]. 
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opportunities, simply because Bank staff had confiscated the tools he needed to 
receive communication from the Bank.19 Failure to follow the proper 
communication procedures was held to constitute a serious breach of the 
redeployment policy. 
The HR Reference Manual and hence the relevant redeployment policy 
were held not to be incorporated into Mr Barker’s employment contract, because 
they were not referred to in his written employment contract, and the Manual itself 
forswore any contractual effect.20 Justice Besanko also held that the policy was not 
an implied term of his employment contract, because it failed the ‘business 
efficacy test’ as explained by Tobias J in Willis v Health Communications Network 
Ltd.21 His employment contract operated reasonably and effectively without it. The 
express statement in the Manual also effectively defeated arguments that the policy 
should be implied at law, or by a course of dealing.22 
Nevertheless, Besanko J held that the Bank had breached Mr Barker’s 
employment contract because its serious breach of its own HR policy constituted 
conduct that was likely to destroy mutual trust and confidence in the employment 
relationship, and this breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in 
contracts of employment in Australia.23 Justice Besanko traversed authority in a 
number of Australian cases to reach the conclusion that this implied term should be 
recognised in Australian law. This case law included Koehler v Cerebos (Aust) Ltd,24 
in which the High Court assumed the existence of the obligation of mutual trust,25 
although his Honour acknowledged that Australian acceptance of this implied term 
was ‘not as clear’ as in English law.26  
Ultimately, Besanko J’s decision in Barker was entirely consistent with the 
decision of Allsop J in Thomson v Orica Australia Pty Ltd.27 In that case, a 
plaintiff employee succeeded in establishing breach of an employment contract on 
the basis that the employer had flouted its own human resources policy. In 
Thomson v Orica, Allsop J held that it was not necessary to prove that the policy 
was incorporated into the employment contract. It was sufficient to demonstrate 
that a serious breach of the policy signaled a breach of the employer’s obligation 
not, without reasonable cause, to act in a manner calculated or likely to destroy 
trust and confidence in the employment relationship.28 In Thomson v Orica, this 
finding was uncomplicated by the existence of any express statement in the policy 
document that it had no contractual effect. In Thomson v Orica, breach of the 
implied term was held to justify the plaintiff employee in treating herself as 
constructively dismissed from her employment. The matter subsequently settled                                                         
19  Ibid 306 [351]. 
20  Ibid 300 [316]. 
21  (2007) 167 IR 425, 435 [33]. See Barker (2012) 229 IR 249, 300 [319]. 
22  Barker (2012) 229 IR 249, 300 [320]. 
23  Ibid 302 [330].  
24  (2005) 222 CLR 44, 54–5 [24]. 
25  Barker (2012) 229 IR 249, 301–2 [324]–[328]. 
26  Ibid 302 [324]. 
27  (2002) 116 IR 186, 223–4 [140]–[143] (‘Thomson v Orica’). 
28  Ibid. 
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without any need for the court to determine a damages award for wrongful 
dismissal. 
In Barker, however, Besanko J did determine a damages award for breach 
of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence during employment, and this is 
the especially novel aspect of the Barker case.29 In early English decisions,30 and 
in Australian cases (including Thomson v Orica), a finding that the employer 
breached the duty not to destroy mutual trust has enabled the affected employee to 
accept the employer’s conduct as a repudiation of the employment contract, and 
claim damages based on a failure to provide notice. In Malik,31 the House of Lords 
determined that as a matter of principle, damages could be awarded for breach of 
the implied term, independently of the damages awarded for wrongful termination, 
but before Barker, no Australian case had yet applied that principle. In Barker, the 
plaintiff employee was allowed to claim damages based on the loss of a chance to 
be redeployed, denied to him as a result of a breach of the obligation of mutual 
trust during the currency of his employment contract. This chance was assessed to 
be worth $317 500 (which represented a 25 per cent chance of earning $1 270 000 
between his termination date and an expected retirement age of 65).32 
It is an important feature of the case that the Bank’s failure to observe its 
own policy, and hence the conduct calculated to destroy trust and confidence, was 
held to have occurred while Mr Barker was still employed, and prior to the Bank’s 
final decision to terminate his employment. Any argument that the Bank’s decision 
to terminate his contract itself constituted breach of the implied term, or that the 
damages flowed from the decision to terminate and not from a prior breach of the 
employment contract, would have faced an obstacle known now as the ‘Johnson 
exclusion zone’.33  
This obstacle, identified by the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys Ltd,34 
precludes an employee from claiming any common law damages based on breach 
of the mutual trust obligation if the claimed damage flows from the fact or manner 
of dismissal. This is because a majority of the House of Lords held that 
development of the common law of employment contracts ought not to be 
permitted to stray into territory claimed by the legislature. Mr Johnson had already 
received the maximum statutory compensation available for unfair dismissal when 
he brought a common law suit against his employer for additional damages                                                         
29  Barker (2012) 229 IR 249, 303 [333]. Five judges of the New South Wales Court of Appeal have 
also left open the possibility that damages may be awarded for breach of an obligation not to 
destroy trust and confidence: see Shaw v State of New South Wales (2012) 219 IR 87 (Barrett JA; 
Beazley, McColl, Macfarlan JJA and McLellan CJ at CL agreeing). In that case, the Court rejected 
an application that a damages claim based on breach of the implied term must necessarily be struck 
out. The substantive question of whether damages would be awarded in that case has yet to be 
determined. 
30  See, eg, Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1987] ICR 700. 
31  [1998] AC 20. Note, however, that Malik was a test case argued on the basis of assumed facts, and 
ultimately the plaintiff employees in that case failed to prove their claim for damages: see Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali (No 2) [2002] ICR 1258. 
32  Barker (2012) 229 IR 249, 309 [370]. 
33  See Weeks, above n 2, 181, and the discussion in Carolyn Sappideen et al, Macken’s Law of 
Employment (Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2011) 167–73. 
34  [2003] 1 AC 518 (‘Johnson’). 
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suffered as a consequence of mental distress following his dismissal. The majority 
held that the existence of a statutory scheme compensating employees for unfair 
dismissal precluded any further development of common law damages for breach 
of the mutual trust and confidence obligation if the claimed breach concerned the 
fact or manner of dismissal. This decision was affirmed in Eastwood v Magnox 
Electric plc,35 and the general principle that the common law ought not to be 
developed in a manner that would be incoherent with a statutory regime has been 
followed in Australia in New South Wales v Paige.36 This ‘Johnson exclusion 
zone’ provided no barrier to recovery for Mr Barker, because his claim depended 
on a breach of an obligation owed to him during his employment. Although his 
position had been made redundant, his employment contract remained on foot 
during the period in which he was eligible to be considered for redeployment. The 
decision to terminate his employment followed the Bank’s failure to observe its 
own redeployment procedure, so both Besanko J and the majority on appeal held 
that the Johnson exclusion zone did not preclude recovery of damages.37 
III Appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court — 
Majority Decision 
In its appeal, the Commonwealth Bank contested the existence of the implied term 
of mutual trust and confidence, and whether such a term (should it exist at all) 
could be breached by failure to follow a non-contractual HR policy. The facts in 
Barker can be distinguished from those of Thomson v Orica on this point. In 
Barker, the policy was expressed not to form part of the contract, no doubt because 
the Bank, like many large and well-advised employers, was mindful of the risks 
apparent from cases such as McCormick v Riverwood International (Australia) Pty 
Ltd38 and Goldman Sachs JB Were Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich39 that a workplace 
policy may be found to comprise contractually binding promises that will benefit 
employees. The majority rejected the Bank’s appeal, finding that Australian law 
should recognise the duty of mutual trust and confidence as a term implied by law 
into employment contracts, on the rationale of ‘necessity’ as it was articulated in 
the earlier decision of a Full Court of the Federal Court in University of Western 
Australia v Gray.40 Their Honours held that the implied duty of trust and 
confidence is necessary, as a matter of policy, to ‘prevent the enjoyment of rights 
conferred by [an employment] contract being rendered nugatory, worthless or 
seriously undermined’,41 and is ‘consistent with the contemporary view of the 
employment relationship as involving elements of common interest and                                                         
35  [2005] 1 AC 503. 
36  (2002) 60 NSWLR 371. 
37  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 456 [14]–[17]. 
38  (1999) 167 ALR 689. 
39  (2007) 13 FCR 62. For commentary on this case, see Louise Keats, ‘Workplace Policy as Contract: 
the Full Federal Court Hands Down its Decision in the Nikolich Appeal’ (2008) 21 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 43.  
40  (2009) 179 FCR 346, 377–9 [141]–[147]. 
41  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 463 [92] (Jacobson and Lander JJ), citing Byrne v Australian 
Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 450; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 103. 
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partnership, rather than of conflict and subordination’.42 They were careful to point 
out that ‘partnership’ should not be read in its strict legal sense, and that the duty 
must not be confused with a fiduciary duty. It was a contractual duty, the content 
of which needed to be ‘moulded according to the nature of the relationship and the 
facts of the case’.43 
The majority also held that the Bank had breached this obligation, but on 
different reasoning from that of Besanko J. The majority disagreed that the Bank’s 
redeployment policy could supply the content of the Bank’s obligation under the 
implied term, because the policy itself was explicitly excluded from having 
contractual effect.44 The specific procedures for providing employees with 
redeployment opportunities were held not to be contractual, either directly or 
indirectly, as a consequence of the employer’s obligation not to destroy trust by 
seriously breaching its own policies. Nevertheless, the majority held that in all of 
the circumstances of this case — including his seniority and service for nearly 
23 years with a large corporate employer with a ‘huge workforce’45 — the implied 
duty not to destroy trust and confidence required the Bank to take positive steps to 
consult with Mr Barker to ‘inform him of suitable employment options’ before 
terminating his employment for redundancy.46  
Under a fresh heading, ‘An alternative approach: the implied duty of co-
operation’, the majority justified the recognition of the implied term on the basis of 
the well-accepted duty of co-operation in contract, which is founded on the 
principle that contracting parties are obliged to ‘do all things necessary to enable 
the other party to have the benefit of the contract’.47 Once treated as a rule of 
contract construction,48 this principle has more recently been accepted by the 
Australian High Court as a ‘term imported into all transactions of a particular 
description’.49  
The existence of a particular clause in Mr Barker’s employment contract 
engaged this principle, or ‘implied duty’, of co-operation. Clause 8 included the 
following stipulation:  
In the case where the position occupied by the Employee becomes redundant 
and the Bank is unable to place the Employee in an alternative position with 
the Bank or one of its related bodies, in keeping with the Employee’s skills 
and experience, the compensation payment will be … 
                                                        
42  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 462 [81] (Jacobson and Lander JJ), quoting South Australia v 
McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, 390 [236]. 
43  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 465 [108] (Jacobson and Lander JJ), citing Hospital Products 
Ltd v US Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 102. 
44  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 466 [113]–[116]. 
45  Ibid 467 [127]. 
46  Ibid 466 [117]. 
47  Ibid 467 [121]. 
48  See Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251, 263 (Lord Blackburn). 
49  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 466 [119] (Jacobson and Lander JJ), citing Secured Income 
Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596, 607 (Mason J); 
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 448–9 (McHugh and Gummow JJ).  
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A method for determining a redundancy payout followed.50 According to this 
‘alternative approach’ to the problem, the implied term of trust and confidence 
supplied a particular interpretation of cl 8. This interpretation assumed that the 
words referring to the Bank’s ‘inability to place the Employee in an alternative 
position’ implied that the parties had ‘contemplated the possibility of redundancy 
and redeployment within the Bank, as an alternative to termination’.51 Given the 
Bank’s size and extensive network of operations, it was proper to construe this 
clause as conferring upon Mr Barker an entitlement to be consulted about 
redeployment opportunities, should his position become redundant.  
Once the majority had accepted that Mr Barker’s employment contract 
included a term entitling him to be consulted on redeployment opportunities, they 
quickly resolved that the primary judge had approached the question of damages 
according to well-established principles permitting the recovery of damages for 
loss of a chance.52 
When the High Court comes to consider the relative merits of the various 
approaches to contract construction that favour Mr Barker’s side of the argument, 
this alternative approach in the majority reasons warrants acceptance. Justice 
Besanko’s view — that a serious breach of a non-contractual policy is sufficient of 
itself to constitute a breach of the employment contract because it is conduct 
calculated or likely to destroy trust and confidence — leaves little room for parties 
to an employment relationship to formulate deliberately mutable internal 
governance rules for themselves. While there is merit in the view that employers 
ought not to be able to exempt themselves from responsibility to observe their own 
policies, a question remains as to whether contract law is the appropriate regulatory 
tool to achieve that result. The essence of contract law is the enforcement of 
voluntarily assumed obligations only. Expectation-based damages are justified on 
the basis that the court is requiring no more than that a party honour its own 
deliberate promises. Other legal rules and remedies are needed if employers are to 
be compelled to comply with best practice.  
If the majority’s reasoning is simply that a large employer such as the 
Commonwealth Bank must be held to an obligation to consult with senior 
employees about redeployment opportunities before dismissing them for 
redundancy, then it is contrary to other Australian authority holding that the 
implied duty of mutual trust and confidence does not constrain an employer’s right 
to decide to terminate an employment contract, so long as the employer observes 
the terms of the contract itself; for example, by providing a stipulated period of 
notice.53 The alternative approach in the majority’s reasons, however, is more 
nuanced. According to this approach, the implied duty of trust and confidence 
operates to assist in the interpretation of ambiguous express provisions in the                                                         
50  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 472 [167]. 
51  Ibid 467 [127]. 
52  Ibid 468 [137]–[138] (Jacobson and Lander JJ), citing Commonwealth of Australia v Amann 
Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64, 103–4; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 
332, 349. 
53  See, eg, Russell v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (2007) 
72 NSWLR 559; Rogan-Gardiner v Woolworths Ltd (No 2) [2010] WASC 290 (4 November 2010). 
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contract. Clause 8, which referred to the possibility of redeployment as an 
alternative to redundancy, could be interpreted in various ways. It may have meant 
nothing more than that the redundancy payout would not be available if the 
employee accepted redeployment. Or it may have meant that the parties would 
consider redeployment first, and if that was not possible, redundancy would 
follow. The choice of how this clause should be interpreted is influenced by the 
implied duty of mutual trust and confidence, which is essentially a duty upon each 
of the parties to cooperate in allowing the other to enjoy the benefit of the contract. 
In a case such as this, where the employer is a large national employer with diverse 
employment opportunities for thousands of people, it is reasonable to infer from a 
clause such as cl 8 that the parties intended Mr Barker to have the benefit of an 
opportunity for redeployment somewhere in the Bank’s network before being 
dismissed for redundancy. The fact that an elaborate HR policy made provision for 
staff redeployment was part of the factual matrix making this interpretation the 
most reasonable one. Why maintain such a policy, if there is no practice of 
assessing redeployment prospects before dismissing staff whose positions have 
become redundant?  
This does not mean that the HR policy manual has become a contract term 
by the back door. The policy manual described in detail the procedures unilaterally 
determined by the Bank for managing the process of staff redeployment. A failure 
to observe any particular procedure would not necessarily breach the employment 
contract. A failure, however, to permit Mr Barker any opportunity at all to access 
redeployment, because other Bank employees had neglectfully, or possibly 
vindictively, cut off his means of receiving relevant information, did constitute a 
serious breach of a duty to cooperate in allowing him the full benefit of a clause in 
his employment contract. This is the preferable approach, because it leaves the 
parties to determine their own contractual commitments, but it assumes that parties 
will cooperate in good faith to enable each to enjoy the intended benefits of their 
contract. It is a tool of contract construction that avoids the risk that one party 
(usually the stronger) will take opportunistic advantage of an ambiguity in contract 
documentation to deny the other party a benefit that both of them (on any fair and 
reasonable interpretation of their deal) fully intended to be available. 
IV Justice Jessup’s Dissent 
Justice Jessup disagreed fundamentally with the proposition that Australian law 
does, or even should, recognise an implied duty not, without good cause, to act in a 
manner calculated or likely to destroy trust and confidence in the employment 
relationship. His reasons are comprehensive and will no doubt form the basis of the 
Bank’s appeal to the High Court. 
First, Jessup J attacked the legitimacy of the English authorities establishing 
the implied term. Notwithstanding that the term is well accepted in a body of 
English jurisprudence, Jessup J argued that in none of the foundational cases 
(including Malik) was it the ratio of the case. The whole jurisprudence was, he 
said, built on obiter. In many of the important cases forming the early pedigree of 
the term, the court accepted the existence of the term upon the agreement of the 
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parties, so its existence did not need to be decided.54 In other cases conceding the 
existence of the term, the court did not find any breach on the facts.55 And some of 
the cases cited as authority for the existence of the term were, in fact, based on 
more general and established principles of contract law.56 This argument ought not 
to detain the Australian High Court for too long. English jurisprudence is relevant 
before the High Court only for its persuasive value, and judicial obiter is as 
relevant to persuasion as a ratio.  
Justice Jessup’s reasons also provided a comprehensive catalogue of 
Australian cases that have considered the implied term, and sometimes assumed its 
existence without deciding, but refused ultimately to apply it to provide a 
remedy.57 The number of cases in which the implied term has been considered is 
testimony to the practical importance of the issue to be determined by the High 
Court. It has certainly featured in much employment contract litigation in recent 
years, but this is the first time the High Court has granted special leave in a case 
concerning the implied term.58 If the High Court accepts the existence of the 
implied term, it will not be because English law must necessarily be followed, nor 
because the term has already become established in Australian jurisprudence 
developed by lower courts, but because the mutual trust obligation ought to be 
accepted — as a term implied by law as a matter of ‘necessity’ or as a principle of 
construction — in contemporary Australian employment contract law.  
V ‘Necessity’ 
Relying on the absence of any mention of the implied term in textbooks predating 
the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 (UK), Jessup J argued that the 
term could not be justified by ‘necessity’. He cited tomes on contract law more 
generally (including Chitty on Contracts, published in 1968), and specific treatises 
on employment contract law, published in the United Kingdom and also in 
Australia.59 This argument assumes that if it was not necessary to imply an 
obligation not to destroy trust and confidence in the employment relationship prior 
to the enactment of employment protection legislation, then there can be no 
‘necessity’ to imply such an obligation now, 40 years later. Employment 
relationships existed and operated without the term prior to its apparent invention 
in Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew,60 so they must be able to operate 
effectively without it now.                                                          
54  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 487 [218] (Jessup J), citing Bliss v South East Thames 
Regional Health Authority [1987] ICR 700; 488–91 [221]–[226], citing Malik [1998] AC 20.  
55  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 487 [217] (Jessup J), citing Woods v WM Car Services 
(Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and [1982] ICR 693. 
56  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 487–8 [219]–[220] (Jessup J), citing Imperial Group Pension 
Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] ICR 524 and Scally v Southern Health and Social Services 
Board [1992] 1 AC 294. 
57  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 495–511 [236]–[282]. 
58  A special leave application from South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344 was refused: 
[2010] HCATrans 25 (12 February 2010). 
59  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 484 [211]. 
60  [1979] IRLR 84. 
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With respect, this argument assumes that the common law is frozen in time, 
and cannot evolve to take account of developments in social attitudes and 
commercial practice. In Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd,61 the 
High Court was prepared to recognise that in ‘modern times’, a principle from a 
60-year-old case referring to the obligations between masters and servants may 
well be superseded given the contemporary expectations between parties to 
employment contracts.62  
This argument also appears to conflate the test of necessity applicable to 
implying terms in fact (the ‘business efficacy’ type of necessity), with the policy-
based test of necessity engaged in considering terms implied at law. It is the 
‘contemporary view’ — that long-term employment relationships engage 
expectations of mutual cooperation rather than subservience — that justified the 
majority in accepting the necessity of implying the mutual trust term,63 not any 
practical imperative to give the contract business efficacy. In practical terms, it 
may be quite possible for an employment contract to subsist without many of the 
terms we have come to expect as ‘implied’ at law, such as the implied term that the 
employer will become the owner of any valuable property created by an employee 
during the course of performing the duties of her employment. Such a term is not 
so ‘necessary’ as a matter of business efficacy that the employer ought to be 
relieved of the trouble of expressly including such a term in an employment 
contract. Neither is it so ‘obvious that it goes without saying’, if the cases 
contesting the application of this implied term are any indication of obviousness.64 
It is, however, a term that derives from an assumption that the master/employer 
who has funded the enterprise and paid for the work should also be entitled to 
claim any abiding fruit from the labour, in the form of property. This is a policy 
position. This term is implied because our property-respecting legal system 
considers it good policy to imply such a term to protect the investments of 
employers, even without express stipulation by the parties.  
VI Contemporary Employment Relationships 
If mutual trust and confidence is to be assessed for its legitimacy as a term implied 
at law in Australia, it must be assessed according to its necessity given 
contemporary Australian policy positions regarding the appropriate relationship 
between employing enterprises and their employees. Justice Jessup indicated that 
he was unconvinced by Lord Steyn’s view (expressed in Malik)65 that employment 
law has developed so that the old notion of a ‘master and servant’ relationship is 
obsolete.66 This author takes a different view.                                                          
61  (2005) 221 CLR 539. 
62  Ibid 566 [80]. The court rejected the view that Collier v Sunday Referee Publishing Co [1940] 
2 KB 647 should be relied upon to reject the proposition that an employee may owe an employee a 
duty to provide meaningful work. In this case, Asquith J said: ‘Provided I pay my cook her wages 
regularly she cannot complain if I choose to take any or all of my meals out’ (at 650). 
63  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 464 [95]. 
64  See, eg, Spencer Industries Pty Ltd v Collins (2003) 58 IPR 425; University of Western Australia v 
Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346. 
65  [1998] AC 20, 45–6. 
66  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 491 [227]. 
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In cases such as Barker, the employer (like many contemporary employers) 
was not an individual master, but a large corporation. A corporate employer, while 
technically a single legal ‘person’, is in economic reality a collective of the 
interests, energies and investments of many different persons (shareholders, 
managers, employees) engaged in co-operative endeavour. In reality, the 
employing enterprise’s decisions affecting the interests of employees will generally 
be taken by other employees. The interests of the corporation and its investors are 
best served when no individual manager has the power capriciously to exclude 
other employees from the intended benefits of the enterprise’s terms of 
employment. Today, the management teams of corporate employers commonly 
create elaborate policy manuals (such as the manual in question in Barker) to 
govern the internal relationships between staff. The master’s prerogative to 
command and the servant’s implied duty to obey are rarely deemed sufficient to 
regulate the more complex interpersonal relationships involved in large corporate 
enterprises.  
These policy manuals do need to be mutable. They need to be modifiable to 
respond to various challenges faced by the enterprise. So it is understandable that 
the Bank in this case (and similar employers in other cases about the legal status of 
policy manuals)67 should seek to avoid any strict contractual liability for the 
commitments made in policy documents. It would be deeply inconvenient if 
employment contracts had to be renegotiated with every individual employee every 
time an employing enterprise discovered a need to adjust its internal governance 
protocols. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the ‘partners’68 in these 
cooperative enterprises do expect that current policies will be applied honestly and 
reasonably, especially if (as was the case here) the employment contract alludes to 
the substance of a policy commitment. Mr Barker’s contract did refer (in cl 8) to 
the possibility of redeployment. The question for the High Court is, should this 
contract clause be interpreted in the light of an overarching obligation to cooperate 
or consult with Mr Barker, in determining his eligibility for deployment? Was a 
negligent (or possibly deliberate and mean-spirited) failure to do so a breach of a 
legally recognised obligation not to destroy the trust and confidence in the 
employment relationship? 
VII Coherence with Statutory Developments 
Another of Jessup J’s serious objections to the implication of the mutual trust and 
confidence term was that it might ‘intersect with legislated norms of conduct’.69 
He was critical of the ‘unwisdom’70 of the British courts in developing a principle 
that was soon found (in Johnson71 and the cases following it72) to be unable to ‘co-                                                        
67  See, eg, Goldman Sachs JB Were Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich (2007) 163 FCR 62; Riverwood 
International (Australia) Pty Ltd v McCormick (2000) 177 ALR 193. 
68  Using ‘partners’ in the general, non-technical sense adopted by the majority in the Barker Appeal 
(2013) 214 FCR 450, 462 [82]. 
69  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 527 [332]. 
70  Ibid. 
71  [2003] 1 AC 518. 
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exist with the detailed regime for the treatment of dismissals that had become the 
subject of legislation’.73 As noted above, the United Kingdom jurisprudence has 
accommodated the problem of potential incoherence with statutory law by marking 
out a ‘Johnson exclusion zone’, so that the implied duty of trust and confidence 
will not be engaged to enable a plaintiff to overreach the maximum damages award 
permitted under statute for an unfair dismissal. 
This appeal provides the High Court with an opportunity to determine 
whether this principle of contract construction applies in Australian circumstances, 
where statutory unfair dismissal laws are framed quite differently from those in the 
United Kingdom. There are many more exclusions from the Australian unfair 
dismissal protections in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).74 Indeed, a managerial 
employee in Mr Barker’s position would not be eligible to apply for an unfair 
dismissal remedy under the Fair Work Act, because he was not employed under a 
modern award or enterprise agreement, and his income exceeded the threshold set 
for non-award employees.75  
Unlike the court process provided by United Kingdom legislation, 
Australian statutory remedies for unfair dismissal have always been a matter for 
determination by an administrative tribunal. The Fair Work Commission and its 
predecessors76 are not courts, and commissioners do not make judicial decisions or 
determine legal rights. While the rights and responsibilities under an employment 
contract may be relevant in determining whether a dismissal was ‘harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable’,77 an applicant does not need to demonstrate that the employer has 
breached the employment contract in order to seek a remedy, and indeed, an 
employee who has technically breached the employment contract may be entitled 
to a remedy if the Commissioner arbitrating the matter determines that dismissal 
was too harsh a penalty for the employee’s misconduct. The principal remedy for a 
successful applicant is reinstatement (which is a remedy generally unavailable to 
employees at common law), and compensation is only awarded when a dismissal 
has been determined to be unfair, but reinstatement is deemed to be impractical or 
inappropriate in the circumstances.78  
The underpinning policy of Australian unfair dismissal legislation is to 
promote job security across the labour market. It is a law concerned with the broad 
public interest in providing a measure of job security for ordinary workers, 
notwithstanding that their employment contracts do not guarantee them that 
security. Hence it excludes many managerial employees. On this view of the 
legislation, the Australian statutory unfair dismissal regime does not manifest any 
intention to interfere with the separate development of the common law of 
individual employment contracts, and there would be no injury to the integrity of                                                                                                                                 
72  Including Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2005] 1 AC 503 and Edwards v Chesterfield Royal 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2012] 2 AC 22. 
73  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 527 [332]. 
74  See Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) pt 3-2, especially ss 382–93 (‘Fair Work Act’). 
75  Fair Work Act s 382(b). 
76  Most recently, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.  
77  Fair Work Act s 385(b). 
78  Ibid s 390(3). 
164 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 36:151 
the statutory scheme from judicial development of the common law of 
employment.  
The view that common law and statutory rights and responsibilities may 
coexist without necessarily intermingling is supported by the High Court decision 
in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd,79 which held that a binding industrial award did 
not necessarily become part of an employee’s common law contract of 
employment. The two systems of law — common law contract, and industrial 
arbitration leading to compulsory awards — were based on different principles, 
and operated independently. Contract law is predicated on the assumption that 
there is no injustice in holding parties to honour their own voluntarily made 
promises, by paying expectation-based damages should they renege. The industrial 
arbitration system was based on the entirely different principle that employers in 
an industry should be compelled (regardless of any agreement of their own) to 
respect the minimum conditions of employment determined by an industrial 
tribunal acting in the public interest to resolve an industrial dispute. The remedies 
flowing from breach of an award are those stipulated in the statutory scheme 
creating that compulsion.  
If this view is applied also to the unfair dismissal provisions, there is no 
reason that the statutory protections should interfere with a principled development 
of the common law of employment, so long as that development is not clearly 
incompatible with a statutory provision. One provision that may preclude 
development of a common law right to seek damages for hurt and humiliation is 
the Fair Work Act s 392(4), which prohibits the Fair Work Commission from 
awarding any compensation in respect of hurt or humiliation in an unfair dismissal 
matter.80 This provision sterilises the impact of Burazin v Blacktown City 
Guardian Pty Ltd,81 in which the Industrial Relations Court of Australia (whose 
jurisdiction was subsequently transferred to the Federal Court) awarded a measure 
of damages for distress to an employee who had been marched off the employer’s 
premises in the most humiliating manner. The Court emphasised that this head of 
damage was awarded as an element of statutory compensation that would not be 
available under common law for so long as Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd82 
remained good law.  
It would be difficult, in the light of this statutory provision, for the High 
Court now to overturn this principle. So, even if the High Court were to find that 
Australian employment law recognised the implied term of trust and confidence, it 
is difficult to see that it could operate in any way that would permit damages to be 
awarded merely for hurt and humiliation or other distress caused as a consequence 
of breach of the employment contract. In Barker, this was not the issue. Mr 
Barker’s successful damages claim was based on the loss of an opportunity to earn                                                         
79  (1995) 185 CLR 410. 
80  Since the introduction of the Work Choices amendments to unfair dismissal provisions in 2006, the 
statutory scheme has specifically prohibited awarding any compensation in respect of ‘hurt and 
humiliation’. See the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 654(9), which was in force from 
27 March 2006 until the enactment of the Fair Work Act s 392(4). 
81  (1996) 142 ALR 144. 
82  [1909] AC 488. 
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future remuneration from the chance of redeployment, and this loss was held to 
have arisen during the term of his employment contract.  
Justice Jessup was not only concerned with potential incoherence with 
statutory unfair dismissal laws. He also said that any general implied term of trust 
and confidence may also ‘overlap’ with standards of employer conduct legislated 
by occupational health and safety laws83 and various anti-discrimination statutes,84 
in particular, the prohibitions on harassment in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth).85 Of course, Mr Barker’s case did not involve any findings of sexual 
harassment. Justice Jessup’s concern appears to be that a general obligation not to 
act in a manner calculated to destroy trust and confidence would be too 
indeterminate, and would risk interfering or overlapping with a range of statutes 
which have, in recent times, been enacted to regulate workplace conduct. This 
argument is the common one, eschewing judicial intervention in fields better 
addressed by a democratically elected Parliament:86  
There is . . . a real question whether the courts should take it upon themselves, 
by the development of the common law, to engage in law reform for a better 
social order . . .  
My concern . . . is that the court is being asked to endorse a norm of conduct 
that would apply to all employment relationships in Australia, yet we do not 
have the advantage, which the legislature enjoys, of being able to consider 
practical implications of the change across all areas and the points of 
intersection between that norm and existing statutory obligations.87  
This concern may be justified where a court exercising common law jurisdiction is 
being asked to depart ‘from a settled rule of the common law’.88 In this case, the 
common law principle claimed on behalf of Mr Barker is neither a radical 
departure from established common law principles, nor is it incongruent with 
contemporary statutory developments. On the majority’s alternative approach, the 
principle is consistent with a well-established duty to cooperate in the common law 
of contract. It is also consistent with the tenor of much contemporary statutory 
development, including the statutes mentioned by Jessup J, all of which concern 
themselves with the more careful protection of the rights, and the personal dignity 
and integrity of employees.89 
If the High Court heeds this particular concern of Jessup J, then it surely is 
time for an Australian employment law statute to recognise a duty of good faith 
performance in employment contracts, as do the laws of our neighbours across the 
Tasman. The New Zealand Parliament has legislated a norm of ‘good faith’ in 
employment. The Employment Relations Act 2000 (NZ) includes among its objects:                                                         
83  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 529 [335]. 
84  Ibid 530 [338]. 
85  Ibid 529–30 [336]–[337]. 
86  Ibid 531 [340(g)]. See also the observations of Mason J in State Government Insurance 
Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617, 633–4. 
87  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 524 [324]–[325]. 
88  State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617, 634 ( Mason J).  
89  See Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and Common Law’ (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 7, 16, for a view that both the common law and statutory developments in Australia now 
recognise ‘a duty of good faith and fair dealing in contract performance’.  
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to build productive employment relationships through the promotion of good 
faith in all aspects of the employment environment and of the employment 
relationship —  
(i)  by recognising that employment relationships must be built not only on the 
implied mutual obligations of trust and confidence, but also on a 
legislative requirement for good faith behaviour.90  
If the development of Australian employment contract law is to be crippled by 
judicial reluctance to recognise a good faith obligation, then the Australian Fair 
Work legislation needs to be amended to include recognition of this norm. 
VIII Status of Workplace Policies 
Justice Jessup concluded that, even if the implied term of trust and confidence 
existed, it could not have been breached in this case by the Bank’s failure to follow 
its own redeployment procedures. This is because the Bank had clearly stipulated 
that the policy manual was to have no contractual effect. Although the Bank and all 
its employees no doubt expected that the Bank would adhere to these policies, that 
expectation could not arise as a matter of contract. The expectation justified by the 
existence of the policy ‘could not have risen higher than its source’.91 ‘Put another 
way, the policies stood outside the bundle of rights and obligations that existed as a 
matter of contract between employer and employee.’92 
This raises an interesting question about the role of HR policy manuals in 
employment. They often provide the most extensive articulation, not only of the 
internal governance practices of an incorporated business enterprise, but also of 
many of the important terms and conditions of long-term employment. For 
example, in Cuttriss v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd,93 a case decided by the New 
Zealand Employment Court in Auckland, the policy in dispute determined 
entitlements to retirement benefits for long-serving employees. The plaintiff in that 
case was contesting a sudden change in policy that withdrew his entitlement to 
about NZ $54 000 overnight.  
Policy documents can contain important terms and conditions of the 
employment bargain. If Jessup J’s argument is correct, it would be open to an 
employer to move many important terms and conditions of employment (including 
salary and other financial entitlements) into policy documents, and disclaim any 
legal obligation to honour those commitments. Notice periods could readily be 
moved into non-contractually binding HR policy manuals. The employee’s ‘bundle 
of rights and obligations’ could readily be reduced to a bundle of obligations, 
bereft of any rights at all. The employment relationship would hardly be 
contractual, but rather an ‘at will’ relationship subject only to any legal regulation 
imposed by statute. If the High Court finds that employers are not constrained by 
any obligation of mutual trust and can capriciously ignore their own policy                                                         
90  Employment Relations Act 2000 (NZ) s 3(a)(i). 
91  Barker Appeal (2013) 214 FCR 450, 533 [348]. 
92  Ibid. 
93  [2007] ERNZ 233 (Travis J). 
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commitments without legal consequences, then employment regulation in Australia 
will no longer be underpinned by contract law. Employment will become an ‘at 
will’ relationship, partially regulated by a patchwork of statutes. 
IX Conclusion 
It will be a great benefit to employment law practitioners to have clarification from 
the High Court about what role, if any, the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence should play in Australian employment law jurisprudence. Although 
Australian courts have rarely decided a case on the basis of a breach of the 
obligation, judicial statements in a number of decisions have encouraged many 
employee plaintiffs to include claims based on an alleged breach of this obligation 
in their statements of claim.94 Allegations of breach of ‘mutual trust and 
confidence’ have indeed become ‘the “abracadabra” of the plaintiff lawyer, 
sprinkled liberally over statements of claim, in the hope of summoning up some 
exceptional damages award from a mundane termination of employment claim’.95 
Clarity about the nature and application of such an obligation, and whether its 
breach can sound in an award of damages, is essential. 
This author hopes very much that the High Court will take this opportunity 
to revisit whether mutual trust and confidence (and indeed ‘good faith’ more 
generally) is properly understood as a term implied by law into certain types of 
contract, or whether it is better understood as a general principle of contract 
construction. The construction argument posits that the duty to cooperate, and the 
duty to perform contracts ‘in good faith’, operate to oblige parties to perform their 
obligations under a contract in a manner that permits the other party to enjoy the 
intended benefits of the contract. Writing extrajudicially, the Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court of Australia has said that it is ‘not a large step to recognise the 
notion [of good faith] as an informing principle, expectation or maxim of the 
common law’.96 If good faith is the commercial cousin of employment law’s 
‘mutual trust and confidence’, then it should not be too great a step to recognise the 
existence of this norm in employment law. If it has any operation at all, it is surely 
to inform the way that parties’ contracts are to be construed and interpreted. The 
majority in the Barker Appeal used the implied term in this way, when construing 
cl 8 of Mr Barker’s employment contract. The construction argument also answers 
Jessup J’s concern with the indeterminacy of an independent implied term. It is to 
be hoped that the High Court will provide some illumination not only of whether 
this obligation exists, but of its juridical nature.                                                         
94  See especially Russell v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney 
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